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Article: 
In After the New Criticism, Frank Lentricchia claims that American deconstructive criticism is "plainly an 
ultimate formalism, a New Criticism denied its ontological supports and cultural goals." The view has been 
hotly contested. Jonathan Culler, for example, has gone so far as to ridicule it openly in his address to the May 
1982 IAPL Conference. Unquestionably, at first sight the idea seems absurd that a "cognitive atheist" such as 
Derrida could be considered remotely similar to critics like Richards and Winters. Nevertheless, I wish to 
support Lentricchia's claim, although, like Culler, I cannot accept the ontological and epistemological 
arguments which led to it. To me, the claim makes sense only if the relationship between so-called "intrinsic 
criticism" and "deconstruction" is grasped in terms of their respective methodologies, rather than in terms of 
what they imply about the nature of art or truth. The method Derrida employs against Saussure's Course and 
other texts is a logical extension of intrinsic method: it is not a new method that can or should replace the old 
one, but an extension which, when carried out, necessarily implies ontological and epistemological conclusions 
which contradict those that presented themselves at the initial stopping place. If in their philosophical 
implications intrinsic and deconstructive theories remain irreconcilably opposed, methodologically they 
complement one another. 
 
The peculiar relationship between these two methods helps to explain deconstructive criticism's rapid rise and 
collapse and why it necessarily brought down intrinsic criticism with it. Although only a brief flash in the 
history of criticism, it is proving to be of unparalleled importance. But this is the subject for another study. For 
now I wish merely to examine the essential features of the two methods. To explain deconstructive method, 
only a brief review of Derrida's own excellent exposition will be necessary; for intrinsic method, however, a 
radical analysis, starting from E. D. Hirsch's definition, will be required. 
 
An unargued premise underlies this analysis, namely, that there is no practical difference between the New 
Critical thesis that literary works should be considered aesthetic objects and the structuralist/formalist thesis that 
a text should be considered as a whole, or as part of a whole, and that the "meaning" of a text is determined by 
the relations of part to part and part to whole. I hold that the vast differences among the material objects of the 
various theories I mention here are irrelevant from the standpoint of pure methodology, since they do not affect 
an underlying unity of procedure. This extraordinarily abstract view of modern criticism is necessary to 
accomplish an appropriate comparison with Derrida's methodology. 
 
Intrinsic Method: A Kantian Tradition 
E. D. Hirsch, Jr., in "Some Aims of Criticism,"2 claims the following about intrinsic criticism: "The original 
and powerful programmatic idea—that literature should be dealt with as literature and not some other thing—
still remains the dominant though not the only guiding principle for the teaching and criticism of literature" 
("SA," 41). In the category of "intrinsic criticism," Hirsch includes the work of men as diverse in style, taste, 
and terminology as Richards, Leavis, Winters, Wimsatt, Booth, and Frye. According to Hirsch, these critics and 
others attributed an exclusive ontological status to literature. Commonly, their assumption was that literature, 
whatever else it may be, is essentially art, and, therefore, aesthetic criteria should determine interpretive 
procedures. 
 
Intrinsic criticism drew its aesthetic criteria directly from the Kantian tradition—the tradition, that is, that 
placed Kant's aesthetics in the camp of what George Dickie has described as "aesthetic attitude" theory. In order 
to translate aesthetic criteria into interpretive procedures, since at bottom aesthetics is a perceptual theory, 
intrinsic theory had to consider literary works as literary objects—as aesthetic objects. Thus, for the purposes of 
intrinsic criticism, works became things. Familiar titles—The Well-Wrought Urn, The Verbal Icon, etc.—are 
often quite honest in this regard. 
 
Once a critic assumes that a literary work is an object, if he is to be able to discuss the meaning of the work and 
argue for his interpretation he must follow a fixed sequence of procedures that lie logically between the starting 
point—the assumption that literary works are aesthetic objects—and the critic's final goal. That goal was an 
ideological one: these critics felt that to maintain our culture's high valuation of literature, a connection between 
its "internal" and "external" traits had to be demonstrable. As Hirsch put it, their common, characteristic goal 
was to "attempt to overcome the traditional disjunction between the artistic qualities of literature (dulce) and its 
instrumental effects (utile)" in order to "explain the common assertion of a pre-established harmony between 
the external effects of literature and its internal traits . . . " ("SA," 43-44). 
 
Intrinsic criticism, therefore, as diverse as the specific instances of its practice are, requires only a few essential 
steps. The first step is to agree to see the work as an aesthetic object. This decision is usually motivated by the 
reader 's recognition of certain conventions that he believes will indicate the author 's intention to produce an 
aesthetic object. The assumption of such conventions is not essential to the method, however. Anything may be 
considered an aesthetic object. 
 
The imposition of the aesthetic attitude upon the text involves a number of effects. First is the reduction of 
existential meaning. Strictly speaking, the attitude is imposed before the text is read—there is as yet no meaning 
to reduce from. As we will see shortly, this does not really matter to intrinsic critics in theory, since "extrinsic 
meaning" will be brought in from the "outside." Second is the assumption of the "text." The text is objectified: 
the marks on the page or the sounds of the voice materially limit the boundaries of the object. From this point 
on, whatever meanings the text is allowed to generate (and this varies from theory to theory) must be tied to the 
text. 
 
A third effect of the aesthetic standpoint leads directly to the second step in the procedure. Viewing the text as a 
self-contained whole implies that it is made up of parts. The essence of intrinsic method is its attempt to explain 
the relationships of part to part and part to whole. But a text does not break itself down into parts—the critic 
must fragment it, segment it, deciding which sounds, words, phrases, sentences, passages, etc., are important, 
equivalent, repetitious, contrasting, and so on. Thus the crucial thing to decide at this juncture is precisely what 
the segments should be. Although segmentation is crucial to intrinsic theory, the theory itself does not demand a 
particular mode of segmentation. It only matters that somehow a sequence of marks on a page becomes 
translated into a pattern of significant units of sense. 
 
Rhetorical versions of the theory, for example, might break the marks into passages which are assumed to have 
a speaker, an audience, a subject, a tone, a set of attitudes expressed by the speaker, and so forth. Thus they 
translate the marks on the page into a sequence in an event of a rhetorical situation. 
 
A number of the earlier European approaches—the Russian Formalist and the Prague schools, for example—
took the "thingness" of poetry quite literally. Literary art, by the process of "defamiliarization" (ostrenenie), 
frustrated the usual transcendent functions of language. According to Formalist thinking, language in its 
primary functions points toward conceptions by interrelating conventional signs. Because language is 
conventional, the possibility of breaking conventions is always present. If a convention is broken, the reader's 
attention moves from what is usually indicated, a concept, to the language itself, a concrete materiality. 
Therefore the segments are marked by deformations of the usual conventional syntax. The problem with these 
schools is that they took each individual segment to be an aesthetic object. Therefore they remained entirely 
within the lower levels of a structure and dealt well only with patterns of repetition and so forth. 
 
Later, the French Structuralists accepted the notion of "closure"— meaning that they took the entire text to be a 
single object. With their work, the text came to be seen as a system of structures, structures within structures. 
For both the Formalists and the Structuralists, however, the principles which determined the processes of 
segmentation were derived from linguistics. Grammar, in other words, served as an heuristic for interpretation. 
 
Thus the second step presupposes the importation of an heuristic. By applying the heuristic, the reader 
simultaneously segments the text and brings each segment into a class or category. The origin of the heuristic is 
unimportant so long as the concepts of the heuristic themselves belong to a conceptual totality Ideally, the 
segmentation is exhaustive, though not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is necessary that no segment be 
constituted or described by a concept from without the heuristic order. Furthermore, segments and passages of 
segments must be described by a set of categories extrinsic to the text itself. Otherwise, according to the theory, 
the reader risks circularity. 
 
The final step, or series of steps, is redescription. Once a pattern or sequence of segments has been established 
(either methodically or, as in the case of "close readers," unconsciously), the critic can introduce a set of more 
general categories—and then introduce more general categories on top of the former. At this "higher" level, the 
work of literature can become obviously connected to the "outside," becoming an example for psychoanalytic 
theories, mythic theories, semiotic theories, or what-not. The sequence "mode," "symbol," "myth"—familiar to 
us in Frye's criticism—is an example of this possibility. In Hirsch's terms, the emphasis would shift from 
meaning to significance; but there really is no clear demarcation between the two. For each theory, the rules of 
redescription are different. Some require the reader to use his "non-literary" experience or his other "literary" 
experience; some require that he avoid using one or the other, or both. Directly related to this, each theory 
handles the problem of plurivocity differently. The amount of ambiguity connotation, irony, and so forth 
depends primarily on the complexity of the initial heuristic order and on the talent and experience of the 
individual critic, but it also depends on the redescription rules of each theory. 
 
The redescription rules depend logically on the nature of the segmentation process, but the actual rules are 
usually illogically related to the process. For example, genres and conventional genre indicators are often used 
as the primary means of reducing plurivocity and as segmenting principles along with an independent 
hierarchical heuristic order, even when there is no logical relationship between the genres and the heuristic. The 
better theories resolve the problem in one of two ways: either by rejecting genre altogether, as did Schlegel and 
Croce, or by fully integrating the genres with the heuristic, as did Frye and Hirsch. 
 
All intrinsic criticisms require these three steps: (1) the establishment of a text as an aesthetic object, (2) the 
segmentation of the text through the application of an independent heuristic order, and (3) the redescription of 
the text by subsuming the segments into a series of more general, more integrally related categories. 
 
Intrinsic criticisms differ from one another primarily according to their assumption of the material ground of the 
formal aesthetic object, by their selection of the independent heuristic order, and by their segmentation of the 
text. Of these, the most crucial to evaluating a particular theory is segmentation. It should be obvious that the 
initial selection of the segments determines immediately what can be considered critical to interpretations by its 
limiting in advance the possible hierarchical orderings. The initial segmentation also restricts the possibilities of 
validation. Obviously no two interpretations will agree if they segment the text differently. For these reasons, 
intrinsic criticism must acknowledge a plurality of equally valid yet mutually conflicting interpretations and 
therefore a plurality of criticisms. 
 
Intrinsic theory cannot avoid critical pluralism, for only one principle endemic to intrinsic theory guides 
segmentation: the segmentation must not be arbitrary; it must be guided by the heuristic. If the text is segmented 
arbitrarily, the interpretation violates the principle of closure; that is, the text is no longer regarded as a unified 
whole—an aesthetic object. At that point intrinsic criticism becomes something else. 
 
Thus, the transition from structuralism to "post-structuralism" began precisely when Roland Barthes recognized 
that criticisms based on structural linguistics had been "reducing language to the sentence and its lexical 
components"
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 and questioned the univocity of the text and the validity of coherent interpretations. He refused to 
approach the text as if it were a concrete whole. Unless the text is approached "step by step," he said, it will lose 
its plurivocity. Approached in this way, the text produces no "final effect" on the reader, presents no unified 
vision, has no dominant theme: " …everything signifies ceaselessly and several times, but without being 
delegated to a great final ensemble, to an ultimate structure" (S/Z, 12). In order to describe the text, therefore, 
he arbitrarily segments it "into a series of brief, contiguous fragments" (S/Z, 19), which he called lexias. Barthes 
has an heuristic—"five major codes under which all the textual signifiers can be grouped" (S/Z, 19)— but the 
segmentation proceeds without reference to the heuristic categories. In addition, Barthes refuses to integrate his 
five codes: " …if we make no effort to structure each code, or the five codes among themselves, we do so 
deliberately, in order to assume the multivalence of the text, its partial reversibility" (S/Z, 20). 
 
To Barthes, the presumption that individual readings should be coherent but that any number of conflicting 
readings could be valid made no sense. From his point of view, admitting that every reading experience is 
actually incoherent and arbitrary is more honest. Whether we accept Barthes's judgment or not, we must at least 
acknowledge that his work discovered one of the boundaries of intrinsic theory. 
 
Another, more limiting boundary—again related to the segmentation process—is, as Hirsch puts it, the 
"tendency of interpretations to be self-contained and incommensurable ... "
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 Since there is no a priori 
correspondence between the heuristic order and the text it is to describe, the initial segmentation must proceed 
by a series of guesses. Hirsch calls these "interpretive hypotheses." Intrinsic theory holds that the hypothesis is 
confirmed if the entire text will fall into line under a hierarchical structure on the basis of the initial hypothesis. 
But, as Hirsch points out, "Every interpreter labors under the handicap of an inevitable circularity: all his 
internal evidence tends to support his hypothesis because much of it was constituted by his hypothesis" (VI, 
166). Thus all interpretations tend to be self-confirming. At the same time, "when a text is construed under 
different generic conceptions, some of the data generated by one conception will be different from those 
generated by the others" (VI, 167). In effect, pluralism results not only when criticisms use different heuristics, 
but also when two interpretations use the same heuristic if they begin with different yet equally acceptable 
initial hypotheses. 
 
Finally, intrinsic criticism is bounded by historicity, which it does not attempt to breach. It takes no account, of 
itself, of change. It is the critique of the present moment, freezing the motion of language into figures on the 
urn. In its initial step, it takes the literary experience as a single unity, rounds off its rough edges into the unity 
of a significant whole, gives it a meaning. This is its great power: intrinsic criticism brings order to its objects—
not only to individual works, but to entire traditions. The changes it marks are of difference, of the comparison 
of unit to unit, and it orders units as it orders relations within units. 
 
Historicity limits intrinsic criticism not because the theory abstracts from temporality, but because it has no way 
of dealing with it. Temporality is not a problem for intrinsic theory—the theory simply assumes the historicality 
of the text. Sigurd Burckhardt, in his "Notes on the Theory of Intrinsic Interpretation,"
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 gives the theory's most 
blatantly naive answer to the objection of historicity, and for that it is the most revealing. To Burckhardt, so 
long as one knows the language in which a text is written, and so long as one knows the relevant topoi of the 
time, one can "gloss" the text: "And, indeed, for many poems glossing is quite sufficient; they do not need an 
interpretation, for (given an understanding of their vocabulary) they are easy to grasp" (SM, 299). Interpretation 
is necessary only when something "disturbs" the reader: "I begin to interpret when I tell myself that the 
'disturbing element' arises from a discrepancy between my conception and the poem itself; it begins when I 
recognize that this conception is an initial and possibly subconscious hypothesis, which must be revised in 
accordance with the text of the poem" (SM, 302). I recognize that Burckhardt's exposition is overly simplistic 
and that it is unfair to equate it with more sophisticated versions of intrinsic theory; still, it points toward the 
most important generalization we can make about intrinsic theory: it does not attempt to understand texts, not in 
the sense meant in modern hermeneutics. Intrinsic theory resolves conflicting understandings. It is a method of 
arbitration. 
 
A great weakness of American deconstructive theory is that it does not acknowledge arbitration as intrinsic 
method's function. This is forgivable since the proponents of the method have seldom acknowledged it 
themselves. Formalists have implied, if not explicitly stated, that form is essential—and that the form revealed 
by their method is essential. This latter conclusion is what deconstruction shows to be spurious. 
 
Deconstructive Method 
Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project first came to the attention of the American scholarly community 
through his essay "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences."
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 There he simply and 
rather elliptically laid out the formal characteristics of structure itself, setting the stage for a critique of 
structuralist thought, which to his mind was in fact a critique of the mainstream of Western thought. His 
argument ran like this: For there to be an ordered interrelation of elements within a structure or system, the 
system must achieve total form through the stability of a "center." The "structurality of structure," accordingly, 
"has always been neutralized or reduced . .. by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of 
presence, a fixed origin" (WD, 278). The origin or center is assumed to escape structurality; that is, it must not 
depend upon its place in the system to be what it is. The center is thus "contradictorily coherent": "The center is 
at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), 
the totality has its presence elsewhere" (WD, 279). In other words, the center must be outside the field of play of 
the structure; the displacements, substitutions, and transformations which govern the elements of the structure 
must refer to the center and yet not affect it. 
 
Derrida's claim is simply that structure is always structural. That is, every structure has many possible centers, 
which is the same as saying no structure is, in itself, centered. He therefore seeks events of decentering thought, 
when structuralism seeks to explain itself only to find that its centers can be understood only in terms of more 
structures. Deconstruction is a method designed specifically to produce such events. It is not an interpretive 
method; rather, it is a method of demonstrating that "intrinsic interpretations" contain within themselves further 
possibilities, including their own contradiction. 
 
Derrida most clearly explains his method, the general strategy of deconstruction, in two places. "The Exorbitant. 
Question of Method," a section in Of Grammatology,
7
 makes clear the motives behind the strategy. "Positions,"
8
 
an interview with the editors of Promesse, spells out the details of the procedure. There are other forms of 
deconstruction, but this is the basic method. 
 
In Derrida's terminology, interpretive strategies which attempt to appropriate texts by recasting their meaning 
through an heuristic are "doubling commentaries." Deconstruction is a "redoubling," a turning of a structural 
interpretation upon itself. As a redoubling, in its initial stages deconstruction does not challenge intrinsic 
theory's presupposition that the text's historicity is unproblematic. Accordingly, deconstruction "does not consist 
of reproducing . . . the conscious, voluntary, intentional relationship that the writer institutes in his exchanges 
with the history to which he belongs thanks to the element of language" (OG, 159). To put to rest any doubts, he 
says, "This method has occasionally been opposed to the traditional doubling commentary; it could be shown 
that it actually comes to terms with it quite easily" (OG, 159). This last is an understatement. Only through an 
initial intrinsic reading can deconstruction reach its aim. 
 
So in order to undermine intrinsic interpretation, Derrida says, "We must begin wherever we are" (historically) 
within an intrinsic reading of the text (whether of an external "reality" or of a "book"). Sometimes he works 
from within someone else's interpretation;
9
 sometimes he supplies his own. The object of his game is to take 
seriously the split between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. These two can always be represented as a set of polar 
oppositions: good, evil; authenticity, inauthenticity; form, content; signifier, signified, etc. By his definition of 
structure, any systematic, "metaphysical" structure will have such an opposition at its center. To show that "in a 
classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but with a 
violent hierarchy" ("P," 36), Derrida reasons that if the hierarchical opposition is not governed by a 
transcendental referent, a simple inversion of the hierarchy will prevent any neutralization leading to an 
antithesis. Here deconstruction differs most radically from Hegelian sublimation. Deconstruction prohibits 
textual unity: it does not expose disunity in order to achieve a greater totality. 
 
And here we find the ultimate goal of deconstruction. Whereas intrinsic theory specifically sought to promote "a 
pre-established harmony between the external effects of literature and its internal traits" ("SA," 43-44), 
deconstruction seeks its disunity Similarly, deconstruction's starting point reverses intrinsic theory's. The 
Kantian aesthetics that guided, for example, T. E. Hulme's notion of the word-image
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—a notion that found its 
most powerful influence in the essays of Pound and Eliot—assumes an a priori fusion between sense and 
sensation. For deconstruction, the thesis of linguistic closure dictates that such a fusion must be demonstrated, if 
it can be, and not merely be assumed. Therefore deconstruction focuses on those "centers" of structure which 
are left untouched by structural analysis because they are supposedly grounded in experience. 
 
The first step of deconstruction, then, is to invert the hierarchy But, at this stage, "the hierarchy of the dual 
opposition always reconstitutes itself" ("P," 36) unless Derrida can, as his second step, "mark the gap" of 
difference between the first and second hierarchy ("P," 36). A difficult problem arises here because it is in 
principle "impossible to take bearings" ("P," 36) from the inside once it has become the outside. 
 
For example, in his deconstruction of Saussure's Course in General Linguistics, Derrida focuses on Saussure's 
exclusion of writing from the domain of language. Saussure claimed that writing was derivitive, and he 
presupposes, Derrida says, "a natural bond of sense to the senses" (OG, 34): "The only true bond, the bond of 
sound" (OG, 35).
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 By this exclusion, Saussure believed, he had assured that the integrity of the thought-
sound—the ideal sign as value—would be subject to immediate intuition. Therefore, when Derrida inverted the 
hierarchy between speech and writing, he had to substitute the "instituted trace" for the phoneme, since the 
former could not possibly claim the proximity to consciousness Saussure attributed to the latter. Nevertheless, it 
could perform the same function within the system: logic does not prevent it from doing so. Still, having no 
content, the trace cannot be considered a concept; it becomes a mere "mark" which notes the difference between 
the original hierarchy and its inversion: 
 
Henceforth, in order to mark this gap more clearly ... it was necessary to analyze, to put to work ... 
certain marks, shall we say ... which I call by analogy (I emphasize this) undecidables, i.e., simulative 
units, "false" verbal, nominal or semantic properties, which escape from inclusion in the philosophical 
(binary) oppositions and which nonetheless inhabit it, resist and disorganize it, but without ever 
constituting a third term, without ever occasioning a solution in the form of speculative dialectics. ("P," 
36) 
 
By "marking the gap" Derrida shows that he does not merely want to criticize a particular interpretation by 
correcting the selection of the hierarchy, substituting another for it. He wants to show that the entire structural 
edifice is built upon air, that the ungrounded mark is in fact the center, and that it will not hold. 
 
In the third stage, then, Derrida rewrites the entire schema on the basis of the mark. At a certain point in the 
process, he reaches what we might call the central metaphor. Derrida calls it "a nervure, a fold, an angle which 
interrupts totalization" ("P," 37). At this point, "no series of semantic valences can any longer be brought to a 
close or gathered all together" ("P," 37), as they were in the original interpretation. The interpretation has the 
same structure as the original, but written now "under erasure" on the grounds of a "concept" that we know is 
only a groundless mark. We cannot claim, then, that at this point the text "opens onto an inexhaustible richness 
of meaning or onto the transcendence of a semantic excess" ("P," 37). It is an ungrounded ambiguity plain and 
simple. 
 
The Legacy 
In effect, Derrida's three-step deconstruction undermines the authority of whatever heuristic may have guided 
an intrinsic interpretation's structuring process. The numerous deconstructions enacted by Derrida and his 
followers demonstrate that no matter how we close off phenomena, no matter what structural models we impose 
upon them, no matter what point of view we take, and no matter how large or small the context we assume, so 
long as we accept the basic formalist assumptions I outlined earlier, our resulting interpretations of these 
phenomena will be the product of the structuring process itself and therefore cannot claim the privilege of being 
guided by the phenomena. 
 
Thus the very possibility of applying deconstructive method serves as the basis for the philosophical claims its 
practitioners have made about the production of difference, the plurivocity of signifiers, the illusion of 
representation, the radical historicity of experience, and so forth. For students of literature, these claims end in 
the conclusion that no text is subject to a definitive, univocal interpretation. Or as Harold Bloom would put it, 
every reading is necessarily a misreading. 
 
Is this all that deconstruction, in the long run, can tell us—that every text has many possible meanings? Only a 
few intrinsic critics ever claimed more. Arbitrating possible meanings, intrinsic method produces coherent 
interpretations. Deconstruction dispells the illusion that readings produced from a fixed standpoint have more 
than a transitory coherence. And now, from the distance of the ten years since Derrida read "Structure, Sign, 
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" at Johns Hopkins, creating the wave that would eventually 
capsize New Criticism, we are tempted to assert that radical plurivocity is all that the structuralist controversy 
has left floating. Does deconstruction destroy intrinsic interpretation and, since the former depends upon the 
latter for its starting point, destroy itself? 
 
In 1977, J. Hillis Miller asserted that intrinsic readings and deconstructionist readings really share a kind of 
symbiotic relationship, that each needs the other in a strange bond "of intimate kinship and at the same time of 
enmity" not "open to a dialectical synthesis."
12
 This may indeed be true. I have already discussed how 
deconstruction presupposes intrinsic reading; and if we consider deconstruction as a way of inventing possible 
readings—as a kind of pre-heuristic procedure—it may very well be that intrinsic interpretation has always 
presupposed deconstruction as well. For example, it is easy to conceive the process of revising an initial 
hypothesis, mentioned but never described by critics such as Burckhardt and Hirsch, as a deconstructive 
process. If it were the case that all the meaning produced by an intrinsic interpretation or its reversal were 
generated by the methods themselves, then we would have to conclude that the two methods mutually destroy 
themselves. Like a "perpetual motion machine," once the force of an initiating will plays out, interpretation 
grinds to a stop. 
 
The parallel analyses I have presented here suggest, however, that of all the processes involved in the 
structuring/destructuring procedures of contemporary criticism one seems to be especially significant: the 
process of segmentation. The reader's determination of emphasis, punctuation, or what Derrida called "interval 
in general"—the unsaid, the unwritten, the implied and perhaps lost background against which signs can make 
sense—seems to fall outside the scope of formalist methodology. Certainly, theories have tried to control or 
neutralize the effects of this process. In classic intrinsic interpretation, passages may be established by an 
heuristic; in late structuralism, they are established arbitrarily; and in deconstruction, although initially using the 
"obvious" segmentation or borrowing from some heuristically established set of passages, the deconstructionist 
must assume that "no passage has any particular priority over the others."
13
 
 
Yet the segmentation process is not necessarily determined by formalist methods simply because it is not 
contained by the rules of language—it is not itself formal. We have always known that in oral presentations, 
two readers of the same text can convey quite different readings of that text simply by varying inflection, voice 
tone, emphasis, and so forth. Now we are considerably more aware that culture, ideology, and psychological 
and physical differences of all sorts affect the way people who share the same language read. More importantly, 
we are now concerned less about the mere fact that these differences exist than about how they come to be. 
Reader response, reception, situation theories and others now recognize that segmentation is the core of the 
problem of interpretation. And this is the legacy of the structuralist controversy. 
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